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THE TANZANIAN PERMANENT COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY-

THE OMBUDSMAN
BmNixAR

FRANK*

INTRODUCTION

In 1966 the United Republic of Tanzania formally created
the Permanent Commission of Enquiry. The Commission was
designed to function as a mechanism by which citizens could
protect themselves from the abuse of governmental power.
National ombudsmen are in office in Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
Norway, New Zealand, Great Britain, Guyana, Mauritius, Northern Ireland and Israel. These all possess features characteristic of classical ombudsman systems:
1. The ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer
of the legislature, usually provided for in the constitution, who

supervises the administration.
2.

He deals with specific complaints from the public against

administrative injustice and maladministration.

3. He has the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but
not to reverse, administrative action.'
If the term ombudsman is restricted to these characteristics
then it is difficult to classify the Tanzanian Permanent Commission as an ombudsman system, Although the Commission
is provided for in the Constitution of Tanzania, and its procedures, powers and privileges are prescribed by Act of Parliament, the Commission possesses a wide variety of unique
attributes. The Commission is appointed by the President and
reports only to the President. Furthermore, Tanzania considers
its Commission to be an' ombudsman at the same time that
it proclaims the Commission to be "an institution which is in
keeping with the traditions, customs and way of life of Tanzanians without too much reliance on the methods imported
'2
from foreign countries."
A solution to this definitional problem may be to use an
appropriate qualifying word such as executive ombudsman, as
suggested by an authority in this field.3 In the United States,
* Member of Pennsylvania Bar; Chairman, American Bar Association
Committee on Ombudsman and Chairman, Federal Bar Association Ombudsman Section, Administrative Law and Procedure Committee.
I THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (2d ed. 1968).
2 Annual Report cf the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, June 1966June 1967, 3 (Dar Es Salaam 1968) [hereinafer cited as 1967 Report].
3 Rowat, The Spread of the Orabudsman Idea, in OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 7, 35 (S. Anderson ed. 1968).
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officials appointed by governors are functioning in Oregon and
Iowa as ombudsmen. Based on this definition, there would be
no problem in classifying the Permanent Commission of Enquiry as an ombudsman institution although it is not of the
classical or legislative model.
The name is not particularly relevant since the ultimate
question which must be answered is not whether the Commission's characteristics match the classical definition, but
rather, whether the Commission works successfully in handling
the public's complaints against the abuses by party and government officials in the developing, one-party country of Tanzania.
The Tanzanian experiment is significant in that if successful
it may point the way to the only system that will work in the
one-party states of Black Africa to protect the citizen and
fill the gap in the machinery of government and party for the
redress of grievances.
4
Reasons for Creating the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The ombudsman system can easily be engrafted upon the
political and legal systems of a country. 5 It has been pointed
out that "an ombudsman can be made to fit almost any form
of democratic constitution" and that "very few institutions
have this degree of universality."'6 Given this attribute of the
ombudsman system and the situation of Tanzania, there were
compelling reasons for Tanzanians to adopt the Commission.
The modern state has assumed an enormous number of
functions resulting from social and welfare legislation. Extensive powers and discretion have been given to government
officials as well as to party officials in one-party states. In many
countries, including Tanzania, there is no constitutional provision guaranteeing the individual's rights. This greatly increases the possibility of friction between officials and citizens.
Some type of protection of the individual is required against
executive and administrative mistake and abuse of power, particularly where there is a vast bureaucracy, great illiteracy and
a basicaly rural population as in Tanzania.
In socialistic and developing countries where the government assumes a large proportion of the policy making and
4

See generally, Frank, The Ombudsman and Human Rights, 22 AD. L.
REV. 467, 478-80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Frank].
5 Seminar on the Effective Realization of Civil and Political Rights at the
National Level, Apr. 25 to May 8, 1967, at Kingston, Jamaica.
6 Wade, The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender, in LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH:

OCCASIONAL

FEREFNCE (NEW DELHI)
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FOR THE

3, 6 (1971).

FOURTH
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The stability of government rule requires that there be general
administrative functions, efficient administration is required.
satisfaction with the exercise of executive power. There must
be controls to see that "public officers are discharging their
duties in the correct manner and are not contributing to the
frustration of official aims." 7 It is in the general and long-range
interests of government that its administration be directly re8
lated to the purpose of its public policy.
Bureaucracy has a key role in a developing country and
there must be adequate administrative support for development
projects to succeed. Such countries must concern themselves
more with the "problems of establishing and maintaining honest
and efficient administration and administrators. 9 Institutions
are needed to "ensure fairness, openness and efficiency in
administration.' 10 Furthermore, one of the unique features of
the ombudsman system which is of interest to one-party states
is that of "providing a feedback from the people at the bottom
of the administrative hierarchy to the politicians at the top."'1
Although it is a principle in Tanzania that the judiciary
should be independent, the Tanzanian courts were not apparently effective in controlling administration. They are crowded,
overworked, slow, bogged down by technicalities and formalities, and overly expensive.12 Court procedures are not readily
understood by an illiterate populace. Rules of justice are subject to displacement by legislative grants of discretionary powers.1 3 Adverse judgments can be overruled by legislative actions.1 4 There are only a few instances of judicial review of
administrative action, and the government is not liable for
damages arising out of torts. There is also a feeling on the
part of some persons that it is best not to cause a confrontation
in court. Despite an increasing use of the criminal courts for
prosecutions involving abuse of power and similar crimes, Tanzania has "inherited much law which is archaic in the context
7Ghai, Ombudsmen and Others, E. Are. J. 1 (mimeo. reprint, 1969) [here-

inafter cited as Ghai].
8Id.
OId., at 8.
10 Id.
11 Rowat, The Ombudsman in Developing Countries, INDIAN
REV. 28, 30 Oct.-Dec. 1968.

ALM.

& MAN.

An Account of the Origin, Practice and Procedure of the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry in Tanzania, The Standard (Dar
Es Salaam) May 15, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter cited as The Standard].

12Man'enya,

13

Ghai, supra note 8, at 3.
and Ghai, Constitutional Innovation and Political Stability
in Tanzania: A Preliminary Assessment, 4 J. MoD. AFR. STuD. 479, 488

14McAuslan

(1966) [hereinafter cited as McAuslan].
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of its new policies" and the Commission is needed "to highlight
anomalies and injustices in the legal system, and hopefully lead
to reform." 15
The National Assembly does not appear to be effective in
the redress of citizen complaints. The Assembly sits for only
about 55 days each year and few of the issues considered involve
individual cases.' 6 In addition, the Assembly plays a subordinate
role to the National Executive Committee of the Tanganyika
African National Union Party (TANU) and as such becomes
subject to the dictates of party politics. In a one-party state
the executive of government and party finds little difficulty in
having the Parliament pass legislation, and in defending itself
against complaints of all kinds. Since one person could act in
different capacities both in the party and the govrnment, the
one-party state system increases the powers wielded and responsibilities of such persons. Unless that power is checked there
is a great likelihood for abuses by such officials.17
Administrative or semi-administrative machinery within the
government and party for reviewing decisions lacks impartiality. In 1970, a Tanzania newspaper stated
Even where there is provided for machinery within the structure
for the individual to appeal or fight for his rights as a worker or
is liberties as a citizen, this machinery may be infected by delay,
indifference, incompetence, or downright inertia. And finally the
appellate machinery and procedures may be quite costly both
financially and in terms of the individual's continued enjoyment
is
of his rights within the locality or sphere of employment.

Thus, a review of existing government and nongovernmental
machinery showed inadequacies for redressing grievances. In
the word of Chief Mang'enya, ".

.

. the traditional means of pro-

tecting the individual's rights against purely administrative
decisions have been outmoded, and in some cases, these means
are quite ineffective.'" 19 The odds were heavily weighted against
the individual and there was "clearly an important need to
establish additional controls on the exercise of administrative
powers. '20 In addition to the need to provide greater security
15
16

Ghai, supra note 8, at 7.
Bayne, Tanzania's Ombudsman: The Permanent Commission of Enquiry,
in LAW

AND THE COMMONWEALTH:

OCCASIONAL PAPERS FOR THE FOURTH

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE (NEW DELHI) 37, 51-2 [hereinafter cited as
Bayne].
17 Kimicha, The Ombudsman and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry,
Econ. Comm'n for Africa, Conference of African Jurists on African Legal
Process and the Individual, Addis Ababa, HR/WP.6 at 2, cited in U.N
Doc. E/CN.14/521. (Apr. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Kimicha].
18 The Nationalist (Dar Es Salaam) July 15, 1970, at 4.
19 The Standard, supra note 12.
20 Ghai, supra note 8, at 3.
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for the citizens, a watchguard was needed to oversee the activities of public administration. For these reasons Tanzania took
the steps to establish the Permanent Commission of Enquiry.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

OF ENQUIRY FUNCTIONS
Consideration must be given at this point to the Tanzanian
environment in which the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
was dsigned to operate since the success of the Commission depended upon the social, economic, geographic, demographic and
political characteristics of Tanzania.2 ' These characteristics mark
Tanzania as being quite different from the other countries
which have ombudsman institutions.
Tanzania's population is over 13 million, and its geographic
area is 364,943 square miles. More than 120 distinct tribal groups
as well as "[H]amitic people and several minority groups like
Indians, Arabs, Comorians, [and] Europeans ' 22 are said to
inhabit the mainland. Religious groups are varied- Christian,
Muslim, Hindu- but indigenous groups are in the majority. The
population of the mainland is almost 99% African.
Tanzania has made strides in education, but its secondary
school and higher education enrollment is comparatively small.
Ten percent of the mainland population is literate.23 The two
main languages are Swahili (official) and English.
In the words of President Nyerere, "Tanzania is a backward
and poor country, most of whose people live in the rural areas.
Our economy depends upon agriculture ....-24 In 1970 the national income per capita was $60. Communications are poor;
there are four daily newspapers with a circulation of 5 per
1,000 people.
Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961, and
a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations the following
year. In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar entered into the union
known as the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania is a oneparty state. In mainland Tanzania the single party is TANU
21 Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT? 37, 45-9 (S. Anderson ed. 1968); Caiden, Ombudsmen for
Under-Developed Countries?, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ISRAEL AND
ABROAD 100-04 (E. Samuel ed. 1968); Cheng, The Ombudsman System
in Evolution: Can It Be Adapted to Commonwealth Developing Countries?, 1967 (mimec. essay, Carlton Univ.).

22 The Standard, supra note 12.
23

BIENEN, TANZANIAN

PARTY

TRANSFORMATION

AND

ECONOMIC

DEVELOP-

MENT 468 (1970).

24 Address by President Julius Nyerere, Aug. 29, 1970, in 9 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 107, 112 (May, 1971).
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and in Zanzibar, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The President,
Julius K. Nyerere, is both Head of State and Head of Government and in fact, as wll as in law, has considerable power.2 5
He is also President of TANU. The National Conference and the
National Executive Committee of TANU are the bodies primarily
responsible for the formulation of government policy.2 6 Chief
Mang'enya has stated that "the Policy of the Party is the only
policy in the country and is therefore the only policy of the
Government. '' 27 The National Assembly is "primarily concerned
with the more detailed task of giving effect to Government
policy through appropriate legislative measures and exercising.
vigilant control over all aspects of Government expenditures. 81
Thus, it plays a role somewhat different from that of the legislature in a Western system.2 9 Comment has already been made
that the National Assembly plays a subordinate role to the
TANU National Executive Committee.
Local government is divided into regions, and regions are
divided into districts. Dual offices in local party and government
are normal. Thus Regional and District Commissioners are also
secretaries of TANU in their respective jurisdictions.
It was announced in 1961 that Tanzania was to be a socialist country. The Swahili word Ujamaa, which means familyhood, defines the Tanzanian socialist policies. In building socialism and in attempting to increase agricultural production Tanzania has combined rural development, state farms and cooperatives with self-help, Ujamaa villages. 30 The Arusha Declaration of 1967 and subsequent policy statements set forth
guidelines for socialistic developments which emphasize selfreliance in both domestic and foreign policy. By 1971 the government had nationalized most industries, banks, a large part
of commerce and trade, and all rental property valued at more
than $14,000.
Reference has already been made to the inexperience of
the civil service. "Africanization' was faced very early in the
civil service when Tanganyika became independent, because in
an independent country certain posts must be manned by "na25

26
27

Bayne, supra note 16, at 37.
Id.
MANG'ENYA,

THE

PERMANENT

COMMISSION

OF

ENQUIRY

(OMBUDSMAN)

4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MANG'ENYA].
28 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Demo-

cratic One Party State 16 (Dar Es Salaam 1968)
Report].
29
Bayne, supra note 16, at 38.
30 New York Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 67, cols. 1-3.
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tionals", and as national policies emerged they required na31
tionals to implement them.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

-

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

On January 14, 1963, President Nyerere made public the
decision of the National Executive of TANU that Tanganyika
should be a democratic one-party state de jure and his authorization to appoint a Presidential Commission to consider the
necessary changes in the Constitution of Tanganyika and the
Constitution of TANU. The report of th Presidential Commission
was issued on March 22, 1965.32
It has been stated that the Presidential Commission had in
mind the ombudsman institution.3 3 Between the time the Presidential Commission was appointed in January of 1964, and the
time it made its report in March of 1965, national ombudsmen
were in office in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and in
one Commonwealth country, New Zealand. The subject of the
ombudsman had been discussed at regional seminars sponsored
by the United Nations Division of Human Rights on the general
topic of judicial and other remedies against the abuse of administrative authority in Ceylon (1959), Buenos Aires (1959), and
Stockholm (1962). The International Commission of Jurists had
discussed the ombudsman at several congresses and conferences
at New Delhi (1959), Rio de Janeiro (1962), and Bangkok (1965).
Tom Sargant, Secretary of Justice, British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, had visited Tanzania in 1964
and provoked discussions about the ombudsman. He discussed
the "possibilities of introducing the ombudsman system in African countries, especially in those where, de facto or de jure,
a one-party system is in operation. ''34 It would seem reasonable
to conclude that the ombudsman concept was in the minds of
some members of the Presidential Commission when it first met.
The Presidential Commission considered the rights of the
individual in the one-party state and deemed it important to
provide adequate safeguards for the individual. It reached the
conclusion that "an attempt to protect individual freedom by
a bill of rights would in the circumstances of Tanganyika today
35
be neither prudent nor effective.
31
MANG'ENYA, supra note
32

Report, supra note 28.

27.

supra note 27.
34 Sargant, Correspondence,8 J. ArR. L. 195-97 (1964).

33 MANG'ENYA,

3

5Report, supranote 28, para. 104.
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The Presidential Commission recognized that many government and party officials exercised wide discretionary powers,
and that their decisions can have "most serious consequences
for the individual. '36 The Presidential Commission was aware
'37
It
of "public concern about the danger of abuse of power.
therefore. had given careful thought to the possibility of providing some safeguard for the ordinary citizen which would
not have the effect of limiting the actions of government and
party and hinder the task of nation building. The Presidential
Commission felt that the Disciplinary Commission of TANU,
which had been established to deal with allegations of misconduct by TANU officials, was not sufficient since abuse of power
was not confined to party officials and "officials of government
at all levels of the administration may also abuse the powers
that have been entrusted to them. ' 38 It pointed out that to be
really effective "such a committee requires to be established
by laws and to enjoy certain powers and protection." 39
Based on its study of Tanzania's situation, the Commission
recommended the establishment of a Permanent Commission of
Enquiry. The National Assembly accepted this recommendation
and the Interim Constitution of 1965 provided for the basic
40
framework of the Commission.
THE

PERMANENT COMMISSION OF ENQUIRYITS MEMBERSHIP AND STAFF

With the exceptions that a member of the Permanent
Commission cannot be a Minister or Junior Minister or hold
any office prescribed by Act of Parliament or any office in
TANU, there are no required qualifications. 41 The Act prohibits
holding other offices such as Speaker of the National Assembly,
judge, judicial officer, civil servant, member of a local government authority and any office in service of such authority,
member of the Electoral Commission, member of a scheduled
organization and any office in service of such scheduled or36

Report, supra note 28, para. 106.

3T Id.
38

Report, supra note 28, para. 107.

39 Id.

The Interim Constitution [hereinafter cited as Constitution] provided
that, subject to its provisions, the powers, immunities and procedure of
the Commission shall be prescribed and regulated by Act of Parliament
(§ 67-9). The National Assembly passed The Permanent Commission
of Enquiry Act on February 22, 1966, and it was enacted on March
7, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Act]. The Act was amended in 1968
[hereinafter cited as Act No. 2], and in the same year, Section 68 of the
Constitution was amended [hereinafter cited as Act No. 36]. No reference is made in the Constitution or the Act to the term ombudsman.
41 Constitution, § 68(2).
40
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ganization. 42 There is no prohibition against being a member of
43
the National Assembly.
The Interim Constitution provided for a membership consisting of a chairman and two other members, rejecting the
proposal of the Presidential Commission for six members. 44
Following the recommendation of the Presidential Commission,
the Interim Constitution requires appointment by the President
of Tanzania. This should be compared to other countries where
appointment is made by Parliament (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway), by the Governor General on recommendation of the House of Representatives (New Zealand), by the
Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition (Guyana and Mauritius), by the Crown on recommendation of the
Government (Great Britain), appointment by the Governor
(Northern Ireland), and appointment by the President upon
recommendation of the Knesset House Committee (Israel).
Every Commissioner is required to take an oath of allegianre
and an oath for the due administration of his office administered
by the President.

45

The Presidential Commission recommended a two-year term
of office. The Interim Constitution provides for a two-year
term except that one of the original members of the Commission other than the Chairman was required to vacate his office
at the end of the first year. 4 , No reappointment was possible
under the original Interim Constitutional provision except after
a lapse of two years. 47 However, the Interim Constituiton was
amended to provide reappointment for a further term of two
years, with no further reappointment possible except after a
42 Act, § 4(1).
43 The Act was amended in 1968 to provide for continuity in service for
any prior appointive office vacated upon appointment to the Conunission, if a person is reappointed to the office upon ceasing to be a Commissioner (Act No. 2).
44 Constitution, § 68(1). The first Chairman of the Commission was Chief
Erasto A.M. Mang'enya, who earlier had been Deputy Speaker of the
National Assembly and Representative to the united Nations and who
continued to serve as a member cf the National Assembly. Serving with

him was Sheikh Mohamed Ramiyah and Samson K. Gabba. Subsequently, Kikwete M. Kikwete replaced Mr. Gabba when his term expired. The present members of the Commission are Justice M.P.K.
Kimicha, Mr. W.N. Bizuru and Sheikh Abdallah I. Chaurembo. Mr.
Herbert Katua, the Secretary to the Commission, was appointed in Janu-

ary, 1966.
45 The form of the oath is attached as a Second Schedule to the Act [Act,
§ 7(1)).
4 Constitution, § 68(4).
47 Id., § 68(3).
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lapse of two years. 48 The original term of two years is unusually
short and not in accordance with the normal ombudsman pattern of four years of service with reappointment possible, or
even service during good behavior until age 65 (as in the case
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). A short term goes
contrary to the independence of the office, although, ". . . a
critic may lose verve and flexibility if too long involved in the
49
same work.
The President has the right to remove a member of the
Commission for misbehavior or for a disability which prevents
discharge of his official functions. 50 In a one-party state other
factors militating against a long term and in favor of a short
term are present. Although it may be recognized that two
years is rather inadequate to acquire the experience required
for the proper functioning of the office, there may be apprehension on the part of civil servants and government and party
officials if longer terms are involved. Commission members
with long tenure "may come to be regarded and may begin to
'
regard themselves as potential leaders of a political opposition."51
The compensation of ombudsmen is generally at a high
level to indicate the importance of the position. This appears
to be true also in Tanzania. The annual salary of the chairman
is three thousand pounds and the salary of the other members,
two thousand pounds. 52 These sums are charged on the Con53
solidated Fund.
Staff appointments, promotions, dismissals, suspension from
work, and leave are governed by the laws relating to the civil
service. Salaries and allowances as well as all the other expenditures of the Permanent Commission are payable out of
monies appropriated by Parliament. 54 Every person appointed
to a Commission office must take and subscribe to an oath of
secrecy administered by a Commissioner.5 5 There are seven administrative officers and two legal officers, all seconded to the
4

8Act No. 36. The terms of Chairman Mang'enya and Sheikh Ramiyah
were extended in 1968 until 1970 when they were replaced by present
members of the Commission. In 1969, the term of K.M. Kikwete was
extended until 1971 when he was replaced by W. N. Bizuru.

49 GELLHORN,

OMBUDSMEN

AND

OTHERS:

CITIZENS

PROTECTORS

IN

COUNTRIES 425 (1966).
5

§ 68(5).
supra note 14, at 504.

0CONSTITUTION,

51 McAUSLAN,
52

1970: 20 shillings equal one pound; 7.14 shillings equal one dollar.

53 Act,
54 Act,

§ 23.
§§ 6, 22.

55 Act, § 7(2).
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Commission. Persons in the service of the United Republic may
be seconded to the Commission by the Principal Secretary, Establishments. 56
The Commission cannot pick staff without reference to
Central Establishment, and promotions cannot be made without
prior consent of Central Establishment and Treasury, 5 7 although
elsewhere, ombudsmen generally control the selection of staff.
These restrictions are inconsistent with the independence of the
office.
The Commission, although not empowered to do so by
statute, has drafted regulations for its own purposes. These regulations cover the following main subjects: procedure in receiving complaints, office routine, decision whether there should
be an enquiry, how to conduct an enquiry, reporting to the
President, miscellaneous matters, Commission activities outside
Dar Es Salaam, and hearing of complaints outside Dar Es
Salaam.
Jurisdiction of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The Interim Constitution provides for the Permanent Commission of Enquiry to "have jurisdiction to enquire into the
conduct of any person to whom this section applies in the exercise of his office or authority, or in abuse thereof."58 The words
"conduct" and "abuse" are not defined in the Interim Constitution or the Act but can be filled in by writings of the former
59
and present chairmen as well as regulations of the Commission.
Chief Mang'enya stated that "conduct" includes acts, decisions
or omissions which relate to administration and that an enquiry
can be made "if an official acted wrongly or acted when he
was not supposed to act, or omitted to do what he was legally
'6 0
bound to do, or if he did not follow standard procedure." The
scope of the jurisdiction of the Commission includes
arbitrary decisions or arrests, omissions, improper use of discretionary powers, decisions made with bad
or decisions that have been influenced by
tions, unnecessary or unexplained delays,
sions, misapplication and misinterpretation
regulations, etc. 61

or malicious motive,
irrelevant consideraobvious wrong deciof laws, by-laws, or

56 Act, § 6.
57 MANG'ENYA,

supra note 27, at 10.

58 Constitution, § 67(1).

supra note 27, at 6; Kirnicha, supra note 17, at 2; Regulations, Permanent Commission of Enquiry 3 [hereinafter cited as Regulations].
MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5.

59 MANG'ENYA,

60

61 Id.

266

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

The Commission has jurisdiction over persons in the service
of the United Republic, party officeholders, and persons in the
service of Commissions, statutory corporate bodies, public authorities, and public boards, as may be specified by Act of Parliament. 2 The jurisdiction of the Commission covers not only
the party and the government, central and local, but also practically all statutory public bodies and party affiliates in the
country. Thus the Commission can investigate the conduct of
ministers, principal secretaries, regional commissioners, area
commissioners, party officials, directors or governors of the
specified organizations, and, except for their judicial decisions,
3
judges and magistrates. 3
The Interim Constitution specifically provides that the President of the United Republic and the Head of the Executive for
4
Zanzibar are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In addition, the Commision has no jurisdiction over the East
African Community, private companies, missions, churches and
the People's Defense Forces." It should be noted that the Second Vice-President is not excluded from the purview of the
Commission.
The Commission cannot "question or review any decision
of any judge, magistrate, or registrar in the exercise of his
judicial functions or any decisions of a tribunal established by
law for the performance of judicial functions in the exercise
of such functions. 6 With the exception of Sweden and Finland,
the exclusion of the judiciary is customary. However, the Commission does challenge their administrative decisions and does
investigate the conduct of judicial officers in the course of their
duties. Questions of delay by the courts have been taken up
by the Commission." The constitutional provision limiting the
jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to judicial and tribunal decisions is a troublesome one, because the Commission
must distinguish between judicial and non-judicial functions.
But the Commission does use a narrow definition of judicial
functions and thus finds many cases justified.68 Complaints
62 Constitution, § 67 (4). A First Schedule attached to the Act lists some 23
scheduled organizations. The Schedule A is out of date because of
nationalization and post-1966 statutory corporations. It should be noted
that an organization need not be set out in the First Schedule of the
Act but may be specified by any other Act (Act, § 2).
63
MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5,.

64 Constitution, §67(4).
65

MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5.
66 Constitution, §67(5).
6
7Ghai,
68

supra note 8, at 4.

Bayne, supra note 16, at 43.
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against the judiciary are frequent. In the 1968-1969 report of the
Commission, it was noted that 189 cases out of 1,434 were complaints against the judiciary.6 The Commission continues to
receive complaints about judicial decisions although the public
has been advised that under the law the Commission has no
jurisdiction.
Zanzibar has its own separate executive, legislature, and
party (ASP) with a wide measure of internal autonomy. The
jurisdiction of the Permanent Commission over Zanzibar is
limited to persons in the service of the United Republic and
to Union matters only.7 0 The executive power in respect to all
matters for Zanzibar other than Union matters is vested in the
Head of the Executive for Zanzibar and excluded from the
71
Commission's jurisdiction.
The Commission is willing to review the detention power of
officials to determine the adequacy of the grounds for the exercise of the powers, but cannot review an exercise of the power
by the President. 72 However, under the Preventive Detention
Act of 1962, a person detained by the President can make representation to an Advisory Committee whose decision is not binding on the President. The Commission can investigate whether
the advice given to the President by the Advisory Committee
73
was correct.
The Commission may exercise its jurisdiction and powers
notwithstanding any written legal provision that an act or
omission shall be final or non-appealable or that no proceeding
or decision shall be challenged, reviewed, quashed or questioned. 74 However, as previously noted, judicial decisions are
final.
PROCEDURE OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

OF ENQUIRY

The Permanent Commission must make an enquiry when
directed to do so by the President, and, subject to direction by
the President not to investigate in any case where the Commission considers that an allegation of misconduct or abuse of
7 5
office or authority ought to be investigated.
Apart from Presidential direction, complaints may be made
69

Annual Report of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, June 1968June 1969, 12 (Dar Es Salaam 1971) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Report].
70 Act, § 3.
71

supra note 27, at 6; Constitution, § 54(1), § 67 (4).
Bayne, supra note 16, at 41.
73 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 6.
74 Act, § 8.
MANG'ENYA,
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orally or in writing, and without charge. Most of the complaints
received are in writing, in English or Swahili, and no particular
form is prescribed. The Commission will not entertain anonymous complaints and will not act upon letters which have copies
sent to other bodies, or letters which are sent to other bodies
with copies to the Commission.7" The Commission is empowered
to investigate on its own initiative.7 7 However, there have been
no such reported instances. 78 A complainant who cannot move
as a result of serious illness or old age debility may deputize another person to write or see the Commission on his behalf. However, before undertaking any investigation, the Commission must
meet the aggrieved person.79 All letters which are new complaints
are seen by the Chairman, who then issues instructions on the
action to be taken and by whom. Files for each complaint are
then opened and the officer who has been designated to handle
the file is requested to take action as soon as possible without
delay. An acknowledgment form is sent to the complainant.
Each Commissioner is requested to endeavor to read each complaint.80
Ombudsman statutes have generally made provision for
complaints from persons in custody. A complainant in custody
on a charge, or after conviction of any offense, or detained
other than under the Preventive Detention Act should have
access to the Commission either in person or by letter.8 1 If by
letter, as in other countries, a duty is imposed on the person
in charge of the place of detention to forward the letter to the
Commission as soon as possible.
The Commission
in its absolute discretion may refuse to investigate or stop any
enquiry commenced if in the opinion of the Commission:
(a) The subject matter of the complaint is trival; or
(b) The complaint is frivolous, or vexatious or is not made in
good faith; or
(c) The complainant has not adequate personal interest in the
subject matter of the complaint; or
(d) Under the law or existing Administrative practice, there
is an adequate remedy or right of appeal; or
(e) Having regard to all the circumstances of the case any
further investigation is unnecessary, the Commission in
76 Regulations, supra note 59, at 1 (b).
77 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 7.
78 Bayne, supra note 16, at 46.
79 Regulations, supra note 59, at 1 (c).
80 Id., at 5, 7, 10.
81 Id., at 43.
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its discretion may refuse to investigate the matter further;
or
The Commission may refuse to investigate or stop any
further enquiry if the complainant had had knowledge of
his cause of action for more than 12 months before the
complaint is received by the Commission. This Section
applies to complaints which arose after the establishment

of the Commission. In such cases the Secretary will
inform the complainant accordingly and may state the rea82
sons as and if the Commission so directs.

The requirement of adequate personal interest would seem
to be unduly restrictive since the wrong sought to be corrected
is abuse of power, and a complaint from a good citizen with
no personal interest other than public welfare should be as
important as one from the person injured.
The requirement of exhaustion of other available remedies
is a significant limitation. Although there are many cases where
the Commission invoked this rule of exclusion, the key word
is "adequate" and in practice the Commission has not rigorously
83
applied its general rule.
The June 1968-June 1969 Annual Report states that the
Commission has declined to take up a case, or discontinued an
investigation where, in addition to the factors covered in Regulation 42 above,
(ii)
(v)
(vi)

there is no substance to warrant further investigation;
or ..
if after a preliminary investigation, there is no prima facie
case against an offiical; or
8 4
it is against Government Policy.

The discretion to refuse to take a case against government policy
is understandable in a one-party state.
Before entering upon the enquiry, the Commission must
record the nature and scope of the enquiry it proposes to make,
inform the appropriate authority of its intention to make the
enquiry and furnish such authority with a copy of the record.s 5
The complete record forms part of the proceedings of the enquiry.
If the facts reveal the case to be genuine and warrant an
enquiry by a Commissioner handling a complaint, the matter
will be brought up at a meeting attended by the Commissioners,
the secretary of the Commission, and the legal advisor. Advice
is obtained from the legal advisor as to whether the case comes
Id. at 42.
Bayne, supra note 16, at 45.
84 1969 Report, supra note 69, at 84.
85
Act, § 9 (1).
82
83
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within the purview of the Commission, and whether there are
legal implications likely to involve the Commission. If the determination is made that the complaint is legally out of order, or
if the Commission is of the opinion that an enquiry is not justified, the complainant is so notified. If the complaint is legally
in order and the Commission decides that an investigation
should be made, the Commission then decides where the investigation will be held. Decisions are made by majority vote;
no abstentions are allowed. If only two Commissioners are
8 6
present and split their votes, then an enquiry will be held.
The Commission may hold a preliminary enquiry to determine whether an enquiry should be made, or whether the scope
of any enquiry should be enlarged, by examining a complainant
87
or consulting with the appropriate authority.
The term appropriate authority means the Principal Secretary of a ministry or department including the Chief Justice,
the Speaker, and the Comptroller and Auditor General, the
Secretary General of the party, the mayor or chairman of a
local government authority, the governing body of a scheduled
organization, a minister, a junior minister, and regional commissioner. In any case not within the above group, appropriate
authority means the President.8
In the course of an enquiry the Commission may enlarge
the nature and scope of any enquiry. It must then make a further record to that effect and furnish the appropriate authority
with a copy.8 9 Every enquiry shall be conducted in private 0
The place and time is decided by the Commission, and at least
two Commissioners must be present at the enquiry 1 The Commission may hear or obtain information from such persons and
may carry out such investigations as it thinks fit.9 2 In practice,
witnesses appear one at a time and out of the presence of the
person against whom the complaint has been made. When a
prima facie case is established, the Commission may call upon
the person complained against. 3 It is not necessary for the
Commission to hold any hearing, and no person is entitled as
of right to be heard by the Commission. However, if at any
Regulations, supra note 59, at 13-16.
Act, § 9(5).
88 Id., § 2.
89 Id., § 9(2).
86
87

90 Id., § 10(1).

91 Regulations, supra note 59, at 18-19.
92 Act, § 10(2).
93

MANG'ENYA,

supra note 27, at 7.
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time during the enquiry it appears to the Commission that its
report or recommendation may seriously affect any person, department, or scheduled organization, it must give notification
and an opportunity to be heard.14 Witnesses in such defense
may be called by the affected person, department, or scheduled
organization or by the Commissioners.!' 5 Witnesses or persons
against whom complaints have been made cannot be represented
by counsel 6 In practice, all persons complained against are
7
accorded the opportunity to present a defenseY
The Comission has the power to require the attendance of
8s
witnesses and the production of documents, papers and things
Such persons shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges
as witnesses have in a court of law, including fees, allowances
and expenses. 9 The Commission may issue warrants of apprehension for any person not complying with a summons, using
police officers to execute such warrants. 10 0 No privilege can
be pleaded against disclosure unless the President certifies that
the giving of any information, the answering of any questions
or the production of any documents, paper or thing might
prejudice the security, defense, or international relations of
Tanzania or the investigation or detection of offenses or would
involve the disclosure of Cabinet deliberations.' 0 1 It should be
noted that anything said, and any document, paper, or thing
produced by any person in the course of an enquiry is privileged in the same manner as if the enquiry were a proceeding
in court.' 0 2 Any information supplied to the Commission is inadmissible against any person in any court or other proceeding
other than further Commission proceedings except for certain
designated offenses of the Penal Code. 10 3 No person is liable
for prosecution by reason of giving information or production
of documents, paper or things except for certain designated
04
offenses such as perjury and similar offenses.1
The Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence and
Act, § 10(2).
95 Regulations, supra note 59, at 22.
96 Id., at 22.
97 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 8.
04

9S Act, § 11 (1).

99Id., §§ 13(1), 11(6).
101 Id., § 11 (4).
102 Id., § 14(1).
102

Id., § 19(2).

103

Id., § 13 (2).
Id., § 14 (3).

104
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"a decision is made on a balance of probability"'0 5 as to the
admission of such evidence. The Commission has stated that it
will play the part of an active judge and that it will not confine itself "to witnesses called by either party or evidence
adduced by such party," and that it will call other witnesses
who may assert any evidence in the inquiry.1 6 It may call on
the assistance of experts at any time and request confidential
reports.1 7 The Attorney General is frequently called upon for
legal advice. 0 8 At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioners
by majority vote decide whether adequate grounds have been
laid for making any report or recommendations. If the Commission finds the evidence insufficient, the case is closed unless
the enquiry was commenced on the instructions of the President
in which case the President will be notified accordingly." 9
The Commission has the right at any time to enter upon any
premises occupied by a department or scheduled organization
to inspect the premises and carry out an investigation for the
purposes of an enquiry, but must notify the appropriate authority before doing so. However, the President may by notice
to the Commission preclude such right of inspection and entry
if the President is satisfied that to do so would prejudice the
security, defense or international relations of Tanzania. 10
SAFARIS
One of the most significant aspects of the Commission in
a basically rural country is its travels on two types of official
safaris: (1) to hold public meetings to explain the work of the
Commission, followed by private sessions to receive complaints;
and (2) to hold investigations."'
The Commission each year has toured the country to explain its activities to the people, civil servants, party officials
and scheduled organization employees. 1 2 In the private sessions
which follow, complaints are heard, advice given and simple
cases settled on the spot. All serious cases requiring notification
105 Kimicha, supra note 17, at 3.
106 Regulations, supra note 59, at 36.
107 Id., at 44.
108 Bayne, supra note 16, at 48.

109 Regulations, supra note 59, at 21, 25.
11o Act, § 12.
111 1967 Report, supra ncte 2, at 4; Annual Report of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, July 1967-June 1968, 3 (Dar Es Salaam 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Report]; 1969 Report, supra note 69, at 3; Regulations, supra note 59, at 46-7.
112 In its first year, the Commission visited 14 regions, 53 districts and
addressed 64,065 persons; in the second year, it visited 7 regions, 10

districts and addressed 21,262 persons.

TANZANIAN

PERMANENT COMMISSION

of the appropriate authority can be decided by at least two
Commissioners, otherwise the case must be referred to Dar Es
Salaam and a full Commission hearing.
The regulations spell out the efforts of the Commission
while on safaris to mark its independence and impariality so
as not to be identified too closely with TANU, government departments or scheduled organizations. For example, travel arrangements should, if possible, avoid accepting the use of motor
vehicles or hospitality from such organizations.
REMEDIES

The Commission is required to report the proceedings of
every enquiry, including its conclusions and recommendations,
to the President. 113 The Commission makes a secret report to
the President if the Commission is of the opinion that the decision, recommendation or omission which was the subject
matter of enquiry (a) appears to be contrary to law; (b) was
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory;
(c) was wrong; or (d) a discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose or that a discretionary decision
has been based on irrelevant grounds or irrelevant considera114
tions have been taken into account.
However, the regulations provide that if at any stage of
an enquiry the Commission is of the opinion that a report to
the President is unnecessary because the matter could be
referred to the appropriate authority for further consideration,
or the omission could be rectified, or the decision could be
canceled or varied, or the law on which the decision, recommendation, act or omission was based should be reconsidered,
or any other steps could be taken to remedy the wrong; then
for the time being a report will not be made to the President
unless the appropriate authority does not respond within a
reasonable time with respect to action taken or if the action
taken does not satisfy the Commission. 115 No comment that is
adverse to any person, department or scheduled organization
shall be contained in a report to the President unless an opportunity to be heard has been given. 116
The Act further requires that every report to the President
shall contain a statement of any action taken by any person
whose conduct is under enquiry, or by the department or
113
114
115
116

Constitution, § 67(3).
Regulations, supra note 59, at 30.
Id., at 26.
Act, § 10(2).
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scheduled organization of which such person is a member or
employee, to correct or ameliorate any conduct, procedure, act
or omission adversely commented upon in the report. 117 This
means that the Commission may informally seek to have its
recommendations accepted by the person, department or scheduled organization complained against. When the recommendations are accepted the matter is concluded.
The Regulations provide that the Commission may disclose
in its report such matters as ought to be disclosed in order to
establish grounds for its recommendations and conclusion. But
the report may not disclose matters that might prejudice the
security, defense or international relations of Tanzania, or the
investigation or detection of offenses, or involve the disclosure
of Cabinet deliberations." 8
The report must be signed by the three Commissioners, and
if the Commissioners are not in agreement the report must
contain a statement of any matter which is the subject of disagreement, which statement must be signed by the dissenting
Commissioner." 9 No member dissented during the first 34
months of operation and dissent could occur only rarely, if at
all, because, as Chief Mang'enya stated: "We iron out differences, filter all opinions, crystallize our recommendations, and
then make one report. '120 This is in accord with the traditional
African method of conducting affairs by free discussion until a
consensus is reached.
In addition to the reports to the President at the conclusion of enquiries, an annual report covering the fiscal period
from July 1 to June 30 is required to be prepared for the President to be placed before the National Assembly. Such reports
may not disclose the identity or contain any statement which
21
may point to the identity of persons complained against.
IMMUNITIES

OF

THE

COMMISSION

No enquiry or proceeding of the Commission can be held
bad for error or irregularity of form. Furthermore, except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, no enquiry, proceeding, process or report of the Commission can be challenged, reviewed,
122
quashed or questioned in any court.
Id., § 15(1).
118 Regulations, supra note 59, at 45.
119 Act, § 15(2).
120 Letter from Chief Mang'enya to author, 1969.
121 Act, § 17.
122 Id., § 18.
117
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No proceeding, civil or criminal, lies against the Commissioners, staff members, or police officers serving or executing
the orders and warrants of the Commission. Anything such a person may do, or say, in the course if the exercise, or intended
exercise, of functions under the Act is immune unless it is
shown such action was taken in bad faith. However, the immunities noted here are not applicable in proceedings involving
violations of the Official Secrets Ordinance, certain sections of
the Penal Code in relation to an enquiry, or Section 20 of the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act (1966) .123
The Commissioners, staff members or police officers aiding
the Commission cannot be called to give evidence in any proceeding of a judicial nature in regard to anything coming to
their knowledge in the exercise of functions under the Act.
However, the immunity is not applicable in proceedings in12 4
volving violations of laws noted in the preceding paragraph.
Reports of the Commission are privileged in the same manner
125
as records and judgments of court proceedings.
OFFmsEs AGAINST THE COMMISSION

Ample protection is given to the Commission and its proceedings by the Act which makes it an offense to:
1. disobey any order of the Commission for attendance or production without lawful justification or excuse;
2. refuse to be examined or answer questions without lawful
justification or excuse;
3. willfully present any false document;
4. make false statements with intent to deceive the Commission;
5. mislead or attempt to mislead the Commission;
6. publish any false or scandalous libel on the Commission;
7. create or join in any disturbance which interrupts or is likely
to interrupt proceedings;
8. willfully obstruct, hinder or resist the Commission or any
other person acting in the exercise of powers conferred by the
Act, without lawful justification or excuse.126

The Act prohibits any person including the Commission
and its staff from disclosing the contents of documents or information other than in the course of official duty. In addition,
any person who knows of such information disclosed in violation of the prohibition and publishes or communicates it to any
other person, other than for the purpose of prosecution under
123Id., § 19(1), (3).

124 Id.
125
126

Id., § 19 (2).
Id., § 20.
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the Act or in the course of official duty, is committing an offense. However, in both instances, prosecution can only be
commenced with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Power to Point Out Defects in Law
No power is given to the Commission to point out defects
in the law, but the Commission has pointed out that in the
127
course of is work obvious defects in law have been discovered.
Chairman Kimicha stated at the 1971 Addis Ababa Conference that the Commission has "persistently pointed out some
defects in the law and the Civil Service Regulations that have
come to its attention during the course of its work. Consequently, some amendments have been effected where necessary.
Likewise, the Commission has commented against some undesir128
able trends in the administration.'
Attitude of Civil Service, Public Officials,
and Scheduled Organization Employees
The bureaucracy initially resisted the idea of the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry. In the First Annual Report of the
Commission, reference is made to one official planting informers
to report back the activities of the Commission and the identity
of complainants. But it

went on to say that ".

.

. all this

'129
In
is now very rare and with time it will stop entirely.
the Second Annual Report it is noted "that some officials still
entertain some misgivings or misapprehension towards the
Commission.' 130 In addition, complainants have been discriminated against by those against whom complaints have been
made and some officials have failed to reply to letters from
the Commission.13' The trends in opposition to the Commission
"have not continued to any significant extent in later years.
This is no doubt due to the manner in which the Commission
has conducted its work . . ."',132 "In the eyes of more junior levels
of the civil service, the P.C.E. is seen as a defender against the
caprice of their seniors, for the awareness among civil servfnts
that the Commission will assist seems to be highly developed,

1967 Report, supra note 2, at 9.
Kimicha, supra note 17, at 5.
129 1967 Report, supra note 2, at 5.
130 1968 Report, supra note 111, at 3.
131 1967 Report, supra note 2 at 13; 1968 Report, supra note 111, at 10; 1969
Report, supra note 69, at 8.
132 Bayne, supranote 16, at 53.
127
128
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33
and it no doubt serves to boost morale in the civil service.'
Publicity
The work of the Commission has been publicized in Tanzania through the newspapers, radio, through the public meetings held on tours, and talks to educational institutions and
Ujamaa villages. Its activity is not a matter of public disclosure
since investigations and reports to the President are secret.
However, the Annual Reports of the Commission placed before
the National Assembly are covered in great depth by the newspapers.

Commission Assistance Where No Jurisdiction
One of the most interesting aspects of the Commission is its
policy to help even those complainants whose cases are outside
the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission pointed out
in its First Report that rather than reject some complaints outright as not being within its jurisdiction, it decided to help
where possible as a "poor man's lawyer" and advise complain34
ants as to where they should go to seek relief.
Chairman Mang'enya advised in 1969 that every individual
who feels aggrieved should lodge a complaint with the Commission and that even though the Commission was not a panacea
for all ills, "the aggrieved individual will always get either
a piece of advice, a word of comfort, a 'flower' of consolation,
or a rewarding decision."'13 5
Minorities
This writer had elsewhere posed the question as to whether
the ombudsman can help in aiding minorities against discrimination and concluded that the institution had not yet developed
an effective record of protecting minorities." 30 Chief Mang'enya
stated that not many complaints are received from non-Africans
and speculated that one reason for this situation is the suspicion
"that the Commission is going to reveal everything and because
it is working as a 'secret police' as some of them call it, they
are afraid of reprisal from the officials whom they may complain against." Another possibility is that the non-African communities do not like to jeopardize their stay in the country
and do not want to get involved. ' 3 This may be a problem
133
134

135

Id.
1967 Report, supra note 2 at 10.

Mang'enya, Nation's Watchdog, The Standard (Dar Es Salaam) Dec. 5,
1969, at 11.

130 Frank, supra note 4, at 489-90.
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"which only time will dissipate, but it does underline the problem faced by an ombudsman in a multi-racial or multi-communal country."'138
Some Observations With Respect to the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The Commission has been in operation for six years and some
observations are in order. The proceedings of the Commission,
the reports to the President, and the actions of the President
on the reports are not disclosed publicly. The activities of the
Commission are revealed only through the annual reports. The
public, therefore, does not have any current information. The
First Annual Report notes "that non-availability of investigated
cases to the public has had the effect of creating the impression
that the Commission has very little to do." 139 This prevents the
government agencies, TANU and the scheduled organizations
from learning of defects which might apply to them and from
taking corrective actions.
The policy of the Commission to help complainants even
when cases are outside the jurisdiction of the Commission indicates a broad and humane approach to its functions. This is
particularly important in a country where most of the population is rural, poor and uneducated.
The Commission performs a valuable service in bringing
itself to the people outside of Dar Es Salaam by going on tours
to the regions, districts and villages to hold public meetings, to
receive complaints and to hold investigations. In the First Annual Report the Commission states that it was on tour for a
total of 215 days during the reporting year.14 0 The Conference
of African jurists on African Legal Process and the Individual
viewed with approval a traveling ombudsman as an effective
institution in the field of the protection of the individual's rights
as evidenced by the Tanzanian experiment with the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry.11
The Commission is subject to effective control by the President and is essentially an instrument of the President. In Tanzania, this may be said to be of advantage to the Comsission
because of the strong role of President Nyerere. But this does
138

Bayne, supra note 16, at 50.

139 1967 Report, supra note 2, at 12.
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mark a major difference in the classical legislative ombudsman
and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry. But this difference
has no significance if on balance the Permanent Commission of
Enquiry is an effective instrument in handling complaints. The
record shows that the Commission is not reluctant to deal with
complaints and recommend corrective action aginst Ministers,
Regional Area Commissioners and other officials of the Government, as well as TANU officials. The Commission does review
the actions of those advising the President or exercising powers
delegated from the President.
Conclusion
The Tanzania Commission must be viewed with critical interest. The ultimate question that must be answered is whether
this is the best system for a one-party state to provide the citizen some device to lodge complaints against both state and
party. Obviously, a one-party state will not permit a device to
function which interferes with government policy, but it must
permit machinery to operate which will siphon off resentment
against party and state. The formation of the Commission is
an admission by TANU that it "has not adopted the fallacy
that, because it is the only lawful political party, there cannot
be anything wrong with it or the Government that is formed
14 2
from it.
It is a brave experiment to permit the aggrieved citizen an
inexpensive and informal remedy to complain against abuses
by party and state. The evidence would seem to indicate that
it works.

142

McAuslan, supra note 14, at 505.
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